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PUTTING THE “UNIFORM” BACK IN THE
SECURITIES LITIGATION UNIFORM STANDARDS
ACT OF 1998: THE CASE FOR EMPLOYING A
REASONABLE RELATIONSHIP APPROACH
Christopher R. Bellacicco+
America’s securities laws are “derive[d] from a simple and straightforward
concept: all investors, whether large institutions or private individuals, should
have access to certain basic facts about an investment prior to buying it, and so
long as they hold it.”1 These laws inform and protect individuals, encouraging
investment and capital exchanges.2 Currently, fifty-two percent of Americans
have money in the stock market.3 When deciding upon funds or companies in
which to invest, average Americans, like other investors, are influenced by the
condition of a company and the statements the company has released regarding
its financial situation.4 However, companies may disenfranchise investors by
providing misleading information or failing to disclose important information,
eventually causing the company’s value to drop.5 Incensed investors may
attempt to sue the company as a class to recover damages to offset the decrease
in value of their stock, even though their losses are not always caused by fraud.6
+
J.D. and Securities Law Program Certificate Candidate, May 2014, The Catholic University of
America, Columbus School of Law; B.A., 2011, The Catholic University of America. The author
would like to thank Professor David A. Lipton for his advice in selecting this topic and suggestions
throughout the writing process. He would also like to thank the members of the Catholic University
Law Review for their help with this Comment. Finally, the author wishes to thank his Aunt
Maureen, whose life exemplified the meaning of hard work and perseverance.
1. The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity,
and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, (June 10, 2013), http://www.sec.
gov/about/whatwedo.shtml.
2. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).
3. Lydia Saad, U.S. Stock Ownership Stays at Record Low, GALLUP, (May 8, 2013),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/162353/stock-ownership-stays-record-low.aspx. This number reflects
persons who own individual stock, stock mutual funds, or retirement accounts such as a 401(k) or
IRA. Id.
4. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 5 (12th ed. 2012) (explaining that investors want extensive and accurate information
about a company’s finances). For this reason, disclosure becomes essential. Id. at 2 (stating that
“[a] distinctive feature of American securities regulation is that it . . . establishes a detailed and
mandatory system of continuing, periodic disclosure with which ‘public’ companies must
comply.”).
5. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–42 (1988) (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806
F.2d 1154, 1160–61 (3d Cir. 1986)) (explaining that because the price of a company’s stock traded
on an open market is dictated by information about the company’s condition, any
misrepresentations will have a detrimental effect on its stock, and adversely affect shareholders).
6. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (stating that “[p]rivate securities
litigation is an indispensable tool with which defrauded investors can recover their losses without
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To combat these frivolous suits, Congress has enacted legislation such as the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) of 1998,7 which
precludes certain class action lawsuits.8 Although recent scholarship has
focused on securities legislation such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,9 the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,10 and the Jumpstart
Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act,11 public companies and investors still feel
the effects of certain controversial 1990s-era statutes.12
In response to the tremendous amount of securities litigation in the early
1990s,13 Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA)

having to rely upon government action.”); S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 4 (1995) (finding that frivolous
securities class action lawsuits may be based on a company’s negative announcement rather than
fraud); id. at 8 (noting that frivolous securities class action lawsuits may be filed in reaction to a
decrease in “stock price, a failed product development project, or even unpredictable adverse
market conditions.”). The government feared that these frivolous suits could adversely affect the
economy. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (remarking that meritless securities class action suits
may undermine the American capital markets).
7. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter SLUSA].
8. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(f)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2006) (preventing securities class actions with a class of
more than fifty persons from being filed); see also infra Part I.B.
9. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of the U.S.C.). Although Sarbanes-Oxley is traditionally associated with
corporate governance reform, it also contains provisions requiring disclosure to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”). See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. 2012) (requiring
anyone owning more than ten percent of an equity security to file with the SEC).
10. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). Dodd-Frank includes, inter alia,
numerous measures aimed at increasing investor protection.
See, e.g.,
15 U.S.C. § 78d(g)(4)(C) (Supp. 2012) (establishing the Office of the Investor Advocate, which
was created to help investors identify problems with financial services).
11. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, sec. 102(b)(1), 126 Stat. 306,
309 (2012) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) (loosening the disclosure requirements for
emerging growth companies when filing registration statements).
12. Lois Yurow, Letter From the Editor, 8 No. 9 WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM: SEC. ELEC.
AGE 2 (2005). In fact, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari for a series of SLUSA cases
stemming from a Ponzi scheme perpetrated by R. Allen Stanford. See Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d
503, 506 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. granted in part sub nom. Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 133
S. Ct. 977. The Supreme Court will interpret the “in connection with” requirement to determine
when covered securities are sufficiently related to non-covered securities to trigger SLUSA
preclusion. Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 81 U.S.L.W. 3405 (U.S. Jan. 18, 2012) (explaining
that the grant of certiorari is limited to Question 1 of the petition for certiorari). However, the
Court’s decision will not likely address the type of misrepresentation allegations contained in a
complaint, nor will it discuss what sort of test should be used to determine whether the allegation
is so interrelated to the claim as to bring it within the ambit of SLUSA. See id.
13. Securities Litigation, INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, http://www.instituteforlegal
reform.com/issues/securities-litigation-0 (last visited July 29, 2013) (observing that abusive
securities litigation was rampant during the early 1990s).
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of 1995,14 which imposed heightened pleading standards to prevent securities
class actions alleging misrepresentation or omission from being brought in
federal courts.15 Yet, plaintiffs sought to avoid PSLRA requirements by filing
suit in state courts, or, in the case of diversity suits, by filing state law claims in
federal court.16
Congress passed SLUSA in 1998 to prevent the circumvention of class actions
in state courts if the action alleges “an untrue statement or omission of a material
fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.”17 If a claim
containing these allegations is filed in state court, the case is removed to federal
court where it may be dismissed under PSLRA.18 If a state law claim containing
such allegations is filed in federal court, the action should be dismissed under
SLUSA.19 However, SLUSA preclusion depends on the federal court’s
interpretation of whether allegations of material misrepresentation must be
explicit in complaints for a suit to be barred by SLUSA.20
Some courts, such as the Sixth Circuit, look beyond the words of the
complaint itself in determining whether there is an allegation of
misrepresentation in connection with securities.21 Other courts, such as the
Ninth Circuit, grant leave to amend and allow those individual claims not
precluded by SLUSA to move forward.22 Still other courts, such as the Third
Circuit, require that claims operate as “factual predicate[s]” to allegations of
misrepresentation in order to be barred by SLUSA, and also allow those
14. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter PSLRA].
15. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2006 & Supp. 2012) (imposing heightened pleading standards
for securities class action litigation such as proving defendant’s state of mind).
16. H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 1 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (finding evidence that more securities
class action lawsuits are now being filed in state courts).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b)(1) (2006). SLUSA’s purpose of preventing class action suits from
being brought in state court to avoid PSLRA is discussed infra at note 40.
18. See 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c) (allowing for removal of “[a]ny covered class action brought in
any State court involving a covered security.”); 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b) (preventing class actions
alleging state law claims of misrepresentation connected to covered securities from proceeding in
state or federal courts).
19. See Davis v. John Hancock Viable Life Ins. Co., 295 F. App’x 245, 246 (9th Cir. 2008)
(noting that SLUSA precludes state law securities class action claims regardless of where the claim
was filed).
20. See Brown v. Calamos, 664 F.3d 123, 127 (7th Cir. 2011) (describing the approaches
taken by different circuits in interpreting the SLUSA requirements), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2774
(2012); see also Thomas O. Gorman, SLUSA Bars Breach of Duty Claim That’s Tangled With
Misrepresentation, 9 No. 1 SEC. LITIG. REP. 9 (2011) (explaining the different approaches taken in
applying SLUSA); Robert L. Shapiro & Janet S. McCloud, Hurdles in Private Securities Fraud
Litigation: An Overview, 8 No. 9 SEC. LITIG. REP. 1, 7 (2011) (observing the different approaches
circuit courts have taken in interpreting the reach of SLUSA’s preemption).
21. See infra Part I.C.1 (discussing the Sixth Circuit’s broad approach to determine whether
a complaint alleges misrepresentation or omission).
22. See infra Part I.C.2. (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s approach, which is similar to the Sixth
Circuit’s but allows plaintiffs to amend their complaints).
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individual claims not precluded to move forward.23 The recent Seventh Circuit
case, Brown v. Calamos, refused to resolve this split.24 Without a Supreme
Court pronouncement on the issue, these circuits will continue to use their
respective approaches.25 This variation in approaches leads to uncertainty and
promotes forum shopping.26 Furthermore, such uncertainty frustrates SLUSA’s
goals of preventing frivolous litigation and promoting uniformity.27
This Comment discusses the approaches taken by various circuits to
determine when SLUSA precludes a securities class action lawsuit that alleges
misrepresentation or omission. Part I begins by describing the history of, and
events leading up to, the passage of SLUSA. It then traces the development of
case law, highlighting the approaches and rationales used by the Sixth, Ninth,
Third, and Seventh Circuits. Part II discusses the shortcomings of these various
approaches and explains why they do not adequately address SLUSA’s goals.
Finally, Part III proposes that courts should adopt a reasonable relationship test
to determine whether an allegation is sufficiently related to a claim to trigger
SLUSA preclusion. This reasonable relationship approach best achieves the
goals of SLUSA—preventing securities class action litigation alleging
misrepresentation.
I. A SPLIT OVER SLUSA: DIVISION OVER PROPER INTERPRETATION OF THE
LAW
A. Pre-SLUSA: PSLRA
During the 1980s and early 1990s, securities class action lawsuits increased
significantly.28 Many of these suits were prompted by decreases in stock prices
23. See Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 398 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 2005); LaSala v.
Bordier et Cie, 519 F.3d 121, 141 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Rowinski, 398 F.3d at 300); see also infra
Part I.C.3. (discussing the Third Circuit’s narrower approach to determining whether a complaint
alleges misrepresentation or omission).
24. 664 F.3d 123, 130 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2774 (2012) (refusing to adopt
a particular approach and holding instead that “the suit is . . . barred by SLUSA under any
reasonable standard”).
25. Id. at 127 (discussing the different circuit court approaches).
26. See John M. Wunderlich, “Uniform” Standards for Securities Class Actions, 80 TENN. L.
REV. 167, 184 (2012) (observing that the standard used to determine whether litigation is precluded
by SLUSA depends on the forum); see also Matthew O’Brien, Choice of Forum In Securities Class
Actions: Confronting “Reform” of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 REV. LITIG. 845, 847 (2009)
(noting the inconsistent outcomes which may result from different circuit court approaches).
27. SLUSA, Pub. L. No. 105-353, sec. 2(5), 112 Stat. 3227, 3227 (1998) (indicating that
SLUSA was enacted to prevent frivolous litigation); see also Wunderlich, supra note 26, at 184
(arguing that having different standards governing securities class action litigation is “contrary to
SLUSA’s goal of uniformity”).
28. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 8 (1995). The report refers to a study that found that, “in the early
1980’s, every company in one business sector that suffered a market loss of $20 million or more in
its capitalization was sued.” Id. (citing Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of
Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 511–13 (1991)). The Senate Report
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often caused not by fraudulent actions, but by an array of other factors such as a
decrease in profits or other negative news affecting a company or investment
fund.29 Faced with a class action lawsuit and the potential liability for millions
of dollars in damages, defendants often tried to settle out of court.30 As a result,
settlement of these suits was no longer based on the merits of the case, but on
the depth of the defendant’s pockets.31
Given the substantial financial impact of these suits on the market, Congress
sought to intervene.32 Congress found that the ease with which plaintiffs could
file these actions contributed to the increasing number of such suits.33 Congress
sought to curb these abusive litigation practices by passing the Private Securities

further notes that one of every six companies under the age of ten years old and backed by venture
capital was sued at least once. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 8 (citing Securities Litigation Reform
Proposals S. 240, S. 667, and H.R. 1058: Hearings on the Impact of Shareholder Lawsuits on
Publicly-Held Companies and to Discourage the Filing of Nuisance or “Strike” Suits By
Entrepreneurial Lawyers Creating a Lucrative Industry from the Filings of Meritless Litigation
and the Extraction of Settlements Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong. 61 (1995) (Testimony of James F. Morgan, PresidentElect, National Venture Capital Association).
29. See S. REP. NO. 105-182, at 23 (1998) (explaining that class action suits were being filed
after a decrease in a company’s stock price with no evidence of fraud); see also supra note 6 (noting
that class action lawsuits may be prompted by events such as negative announcements by a
company).
30. See S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 4 (finding that lawyers would file “frivolous ‘strike’ suits
alleging violations of the Federal securities laws in the hope that defendants will quickly settle to
avoid the expense of litigation.”); see also Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? supra note 28, at 532
(noting that many companies are inclined to settle in securities class actions because the potential
costs are so high that a loss could result in insolvency); Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking
Damages in Securities Class Action, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1488 (1996) (recognizing public
companies may be forced to pay hundreds of millions of dollars in securities class action suits);
Jennifer O’Hare, Preemption Under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act: If It Looks
Like a Securities Fraud Claim And Acts Like a Securities Fraud Claim, Is It a Securities Fraud
Claim?, 56 ALA. L. REV. 325, 335 (2004) (indicating defendants would settle a case regardless of
the merits because it was cheaper to settle than to pay for the litigation-related costs).
31. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 9; see also Summary of Testimony of the United States Securities
and Exchange Commission 6 (1997), http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/testarchive
/1997/tsty1997.txt (testifying that securities class action suits have “the potential for substantial
rewards.”).
32. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 78 (2006)
(remarking on the overwhelming need to ensure market-place efficiency for securities trading); S.
REP. NO. 105-182, at 23 (maintaining these suits entail significant legal fees, “harming both the
business and its shareholders.”); S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 4 (noting frivolous litigation “increase[s]
the cost of raising capital and chill[s] corporate disclosure”). Some scholars argue by contrast that
PSLRA’s passage was due to external pressure. See, e.g., Richard W. Painter, Responding to a
False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV.
1, 32 (1998) (arguing that securities-related entities gained significant leverage in Congress after
the 1994 elections).
33. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 8.
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Litigation Reform Act of 1995.34 PSLRA provides that for any action that
alleges that the defendant “made an untrue statement of a material fact; or
omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made,”35 the plaintiff must specifically show which statement(s) are misleading,
why they are misleading, and must “state with particularity all facts on which
that belief is formed.”36 Plaintiffs seeking to recover money damages under
claims requiring a specific state of mind must also provide those facts “giving
rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of
mind.”37
PSLRA heightened the pleading requirements for plaintiffs filing in federal
court alleging misrepresentation or material omission, making it more difficult
for these claims to proceed.38 By enacting PSLRA, Congress intended to dispose
of suits designed only to induce defendants to avoid costly litigation by
settling.39 Plaintiffs attempted to evade this hurdle by filing actions in state
courts, where PSLRA’s heightened pleading requirements did not apply.40 This

34. See PSLRA, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of the U.S.C.); S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 10. It was difficult to pass the PSLRA because,
although both houses of Congress approved the Act, President Bill Clinton vetoed it. Michael A.
Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 50
STAN. L. REV. 273, 289 (1998) (observing further that despite agreement in Congress that there
was a problem, the debates over potential solutions were frequently acrimonious, but noting that
once the bill was vetoed by President Clinton, Congress was quick to override the veto).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)(A)–(B) (2006).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)(B) (2006).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006 & Supp. 2012).
38. David M. Levine & Adam C. Pritchard, The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
of 1998: The Sun Sets on California’s Blue Sky Laws, 54 BUS. LAW. 1, 4 (1998); see also O’Hare,
supra note 30, at 335 (noting that federal securities law reforms by PSLRA were intended to
heighten the procedural requirements plaintiffs must meet to state a private securities fraud claim).
Therefore, laws such as PSLRA and SLUSA serve as “exception[s] to the
well-pleaded complaint rule.” Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 398 F.3d 294, 297–98 (3d
Cir. 2005). The pleading standards imposed by PSLRA differ from the standard used today for
non-securities class action pleadings, which requires that “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007));
see also Perino, supra note 34, at 292 (noting that PSLRA creates a separate class of procedural
rules specific to securities fraud cases).
39. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 82 (2006).
40. See Levine & Pritchard, supra note 38, at 7; Perino, supra note 34, at 315 (observing the
dramatic rise of securities fraud filings in state court, most likely due to plaintiffs attempting to
contravene PSLRA’s new requirements). This migration to state courts could also have been
encouraged in part by more favorable state securities regulation laws, known as “blue sky laws,”
which did not contain the strict pleading and procedural requirements of PSLRA. Levine &
Pritchard, supra note 38, at 3. Plaintiffs also sought to circumvent SLUSA by filing claims based
on allegations other than fraud. O’Hare, supra note 30, at 348.
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led to a massive increase in the number of securities class action suits filed in
state courts.41
B. The Enactment of SLUSA
Congress passed SLUSA to prevent private parties from circumventing
PSLRA by bringing securities class action lawsuits alleging fraud in state
court.42 SLUSA provides, in part, that “[n]o covered class action . . . may be
maintained in any State or Federal court by any private party alleging . . . an
untrue statement or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase
or sale of a covered security.”43 Furthermore, SLUSA provides for automatic
removal of cases from state court to federal court.44 Congress sought to ensure
41. Levine & Pritchard, supra note 38, at 7; see also Dabit, 547 U.S. at 82 (pointing out that
PSLRA had caused many individuals “to avoid the federal forum altogether”). But see MARC I.
STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 247 (4th ed. 2007) (concluding that despite
SLUSA, plaintiffs are still likely to appeal on the basis of state securities laws).
42. SLUSA, Pub. L. No. 105-353, sec. 2, 112 Stat. 3227, 3227 (1998); see also Kircher v.
Putnam Funds Trust, 403 F.3d 478, 482 (7th Cir. 2005), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
547 U.S. 633 (2006) (explaining SLUSA prevents plaintiffs from filing in securities class action
litigation in state court and sidestepping PSLRA requirements); DAVID A. LIPTON, 15A
BROKER-DEALER REGULATION § 5:16 (2012) (noting that SLUSA was passed “to close the state
suit loophole and mandate federal jurisdiction over particular class action securities cases.”).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b)(1) (2006). Despite the phrase “purchase or sale,” the Supreme Court
has held SLUSA also applies to individuals who currently hold or did hold securities at the time of
the alleged fraud. Dabit, 547 U.S. at 89 (holding it did not matter that a class action was brought
by a holder of a security rather than a purchaser or seller); see also Backus v. Conn. Comm. Bank,
N.A., 789 F. Supp. 2d 292, 305 (D. Conn. 2011) (quoting Fisher v. Kanas, 288 F. App’x 721, 723
(2d Cir. 2008)) (dismissing a suit under SLUSA because the Supreme Court’s holding in Dabit
mandates a suit must be dismissed when a securities holder, who did not purchase or sell the
security, alleges that the security declined in value). While Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
prescribes what constitutes a class action, a “covered class action” for purposes of SLUSA is one
in which “damages are sought on behalf of more than 50 persons or prospective class members.”
15 U.S.C. § 77p(f)(2)(A)(i)–(ii) (2006). The term “covered security” refers to those securities listed
and traded on national exchanges. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(1) (2006 & Supp. 2012). The Second and
Eighth Circuits have held that variable annuities are “covered securities” within the meaning of
SLUSA. See Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 251 F.3d 101, 109 (2d Cir. 2001)
(reasoning that according to the 1940 Investment Company Act, accounts used to market variable
annuities require SEC registration); see also Dudek v. Prudential Secs., Inc., 295 F.3d 875, 878 (8th
Cir. 2002) (relying on Lander and holding the same). The Eleventh Circuit has held that variable
life insurance policies qualify as “covered securities” within the meaning of SLUSA. See Herndon
v. Equitable Variable Life Ins. Co., 325 F.3d 1252, 1254 (11th Cir. 2003) (reasoning that like the
variable annuities considered in Lander, variable life insurance policies need to be registered with
the SEC under the Investment Company Act).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c) (2006). SLUSA contains narrow exceptions that permit covered class
actions to proceed in state court. See Painter, supra note 32, at 56–57 (discussing the Delaware
carve-out and state action exemptions to SLUSA). One exception is the “Delaware carve out,”
which “preserves state jurisdiction over corporate law claims in situations when plaintiffs allege
that corporate managers made misleading statements in order to obtain shareholder approval of a
transaction.” Id. at 56. However, “the carve out is limited to actions ‘based upon the statutory or
common law of the State in which the issue is incorporated . . . or organized.’” A.C. Pritchard,
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that PSLRA became “the new national standard for most securities fraud class
actions.”45 Once a lawsuit is filed in state court alleging either misrepresentation
or omission relating to covered securities, the suit may be removed to federal
court where it will be subject to PSLRA.46 Although Congress recognized such
a provision could preclude legitimate investor fraud claims,47 it did not provide
any special exception that would allow individual claims not barred by SLUSA
to proceed.48 By failing to provide this exception, Congress curbed the litigation
brought in state courts.49
C. Courts Have Taken Different Approaches in Interpreting SLUSA
Since SLUSA’s enactment, a split has emerged between various Circuit
Courts of Appeal over what level of fraud plaintiffs must allege for SLUSA to
preclude a suit.50 The Sixth Circuit has held that securities class actions that
sound in misrepresentation are precluded.51 The Ninth Circuit has held the same
but also allows plaintiffs to amend their complaints and allows the individual
Constitutional Federalism, Individual Liberty, and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
U.
L.
Q.
435,
493
(2000)
(citing
of
1998,
76
WASH.
15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(1) (2006)). While there has been considerable debate over the applicability of
this provision, a complete discussion is beyond the scope of this Comment. See, e.g., Atkinson v.
Morgan Asset Mgmt., 658 F.3d 549, 554 (6th Cir. 2011) (narrowly construing the carve out and
holding plaintiffs’ claim did not fall under the exception). But see Greaves v. McAuley, 264 F.
Supp. 2d 1078, 1083 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (construing the carve out provision more broadly and holding
some of plaintiffs’ claims fell within the exception).
45. Levine & Pritchard, supra note 38, at 32 (highlighting the important relationship between
SLUSA and PSLRA).
46. Id. After its passage, courts were left to determine how SLUSA would apply to conduct
occurring before its enactment. See Blaz v. Belfer, 368 F.3d 501, 503 (5th Cir. 2004) (deciding
that SLUSA could be applied retroactively). Courts have held that SLUSA retroactively applies to
suits alleging pre-enactment conduct because the law governs procedural rather than substantive
issues. See id. at 502 (holding plaintiffs’ claim was retroactively precluded by SLUSA because the
law deals with filing the claim rather than its substance); Winne v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y
of U.S., 315 F. Supp. 2d 404, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (conceding that while retroactive application
should be disfavored, SLUSA retroactively applied because it covers the required procedure rather
than the substance of the claim).
47. S. REP. NO. 105-182, at 11–22 (1998) (statements by Senators Bryon, Johnson and
Sarbanes opposing the passage of SLUSA due to concerns of precluding legitimate investor suits).
48. The only exceptions Congress granted which would allow claims to proceed under
SLUSA include the Delaware carve out and the State action exemptions. See supra note 44.
49. See Jennifer J. Johnson, Securities Class Actions in State Court, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 349,
387 (2011) (concluding that Congress has been successful in substantially preventing securities
class actions in state court); see also Jennifer J. Johnson, Secondary Liability for Securities Fraud:
Gatekeepers in State Court, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 463, 492 (2011) (arguing that PSLRA’s and
SLUSA’s preemption provisions have created a scenario where “most blue sky claims against
secondary participants, in securities fraud cases involving public companies, are only viable in state
court as individual actions or very small class actions with fewer than fifty class members.”).
50. This circuit split is discussed infra Part I.C.1–3.
51. See, e.g., Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., 581 F.3d 305, 312 (6th Cir. 2009) (construing
SLUSA broadly and holding that the law precluded plaintiffs’ claims); see infra Part I.C.1.
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claims that are not precluded by SLUSA to proceed.52 The Third Circuit has
held that allegations of misrepresentation must be connected to the purchase or
sale of the security and must operate as a “factual predicate” to the legal claim.53
The Third Circuit has also allowed those individual claims not precluded by
SLUSA to move forward.54
1. The Sixth Circuit Approach: Playing Hardball
In ruling on several SLUSA cases, the Sixth Circuit has developed a unique
approach to determine whether a complaint alleges a misrepresentation or
omission.55
This approach broadly interprets
what constitutes a
misrepresentation or omission under SLUSA and when plaintiffs have alleged
a misrepresentation or omission.56 If the allegations fall within the Sixth
Circuit’s broad interpretation of SLUSA’s preclusion provisions, the action is
immediately dismissed.57
For example, in Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., the beneficiary of trust
accounts administered by Fifth Third Bank sued the bank on behalf of himself
and all other beneficiaries for which the bank acted as a trustee.58 According to
the plaintiff, the bank invested assets in its own fund rather than those of its
competitors and failed to deliver on its promise that accounts would receive
“‘individualized’ management.”59 Instead, the bank invested assets in low

52. See, e.g., Stoody-Broser v. Bank of America, N.A., 442 F. App’x 247, 249 (9th Cir. 2011)
(remanding and granting plaintiffs leave to amend); see also infra Part I.C.2.
53. See Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 398 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding
that SLUSA precluded plaintiffs’ claims because allegations of misrepresentation operated as
“factual predicates[]” to plaintiffs’ claims).
54. See, e.g., LaSala v. Bordier et Cie, 519 F.3d 121, 143 (3d Cir. 2008) (allowing corporate
claims not precluded by SLUSA to proceed); see infra Part I.C.3.
55. Segal, 581 F.3d at 311–12 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that when a complaint meets SLUSA’s
preclusion requirements—contains allegations of misrepresentation related to securities sale or
purchase—it must be dismissed); Atkinson v. Morgan Asset Mgmt., Inc., 658 F.3d 549, 555 (6th
Cir. 2011) (applying the Segal approach to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims alleging “pure and simple”
misrepresentation and omission in connection with a securities transaction). In Brown, the Seventh
Circuit referred to the Sixth Circuit’s approach as the “literalist” approach, explaining that this
approach dismisses a complaint when “the complaint can be interpreted as ‘alleging a
misrepresentation or [in fact, and] omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or
sale of a covered security.’” Brown v. Calamos, 664 F.3d 123, 127 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied
132 S. Ct. 2774 (2012).
56. See Segal, 581 F.3d at 309 (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit,
547 U.S. 71, 84–86 (2006)) (recognizing “the Supreme Court has construed [SLUSA’s] expansive
language broadly.”).
57. See id. at 311–12; Brown, 664 F.3d at 128 (evaluating the Sixth Circuit’s approach of
dismissing a precluded claims with prejudice).
58. Segal, 581 F.3d at 308.
59. Id.
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reward funds to cover the investment accounts’ tax liabilities.60 Plaintiffs
alleged that by doing so, the bank breached its fiduciary and contractual duties.61
Although the complaint made no explicit mention of misrepresentation or
omission, the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed the
case.62 In justifying its dismissal, the Segal court cast a wide net in search of the
presence of misrepresentations.63 The court held that the factual basis for the
complaint was misrepresentation, omission, or deception relating to the bank’s
investment of the plaintiffs’ funds,64 and found this allegation sufficient to bring
the case within SLUSA’s preclusive purview.65
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the suit was barred
under SLUSA.66 The court reasoned that the complaint still contained
allegations of misrepresentation by stating that the bank acted dishonestly when
it invested in its proprietary mutual funds without informing the beneficiaries.67
Moreover, the court found that these misrepresentations were related to the
bank’s mutual fund transactions and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the
suit.68
Rather than look to the specific words used to allege the claims, the Sixth
Circuit considered the complaint’s substance.69 The court gave little credence
to the complaint’s disclaimer denying any allegations of misrepresentation.70
Instead, the court viewed the complaint broadly, looking to the allegations in the

60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., No. 1:07-cv-348, 2008 WL 819290, at *7 (S.D. Ohio
Mar. 25, 2008) (dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint as precluded by SLUSA because the claims
allege fraud related to a securities transaction).
63. See id. at *4–*7.
64. Id. at *4.
65. Id. at *7.
66. Segal, 581 F.3d at 308.
67. Id. at 309–10.
68. Id. at 310.
69. Id. at 311 (declaring also that a plaintiff “cannot avoid [SLUSA’s] application through
artful pleading that removes the covered words from the complaint but leaves in the covered
concepts”).
70. Id. at 310. The disclaimer in the complaint stated: “None of the causes of action stated
herein are based upon any misrepresentation or failure to disclose material facts to plaintiff.” Id.
The lower court also gave little weight to this disclaimer. See Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A.,
1:07-cv-348, 2008 WL 819290, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 25, 2008) (declaring that “the court can and
should disregard the particular labels or titles Plaintiffs may affix to their claims when determining
if SLUSA precludes those claims.”). Other courts have also explained that the concept, and not the
words used to express it, is the operative issue courts consider when determining if there is SLUSA
preclusion. See, e.g., Miller v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 391 F.3d 698, 702 (5th Cir. 2004) (stating
preemption by SLUSA is not based on the label one uses when referring to a claim, but the content
of the claim itself).
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complaint as a whole to determine if there were allegations of fraud.71 Based on
its review, the court concluded that the plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty, unjust
enrichment, and breach of contract counts were based on the bank’s purchase of
mutual shares, which inextricably connects them with the purchase of a covered
security.72 The court found that because the substance of the complaint included
allegations of misrepresentation in connection with the purchase of covered
securities, the entire complaint was precluded under SLUSA.73
Similarly, in Atkinson v. Morgan Asset Management, Inc., a group of
shareholders brought a class action suit in state court against mutual fund
advisors alleging, inter alia, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and
negligent misrepresentation, on the grounds that the “[d]efendants took
unjustified risks” with fund assets without shareholders’ knowledge.74 When
the case was removed to federal court, the plaintiffs argued that their suit was
not precluded by SLUSA because, although the complaint may have included
fraud-based allegations, “SLUSA bars only claims that require fraud as a
necessary element.”75 Plaintiffs further contended that any allegations of fraud
or misrepresentation were merely “background information” and not part of the
“necessary elements” required to prove their claims.76 Plaintiffs argued that
even if some of their claims were precluded by SLUSA, others, which fell
outside SLUSA’s reach, should be allowed to proceed.77
The District Court for the Western District of Tennessee held that the entire
action fell within SLUSA’s preclusive provisions, because all of the claims
alleged involved some sort of misrepresentation.78 The Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed, looking to the substance of the complaint and holding the suit
was barred by SLUSA because “‘allegations of omissions or other deceitful
activity’ pervaded each of Plaintiffs’ claims.”79 The court dismissed the suit

71. Segal, 581 F.3d at 311 (stating SLUSA does not distinguish between different types of
allegations of misrepresentation in connection with securities; it only looks to see if these
allegations are present); see also Daniels v. Morgan Asset Mgmt., Inc., 743 F. Supp. 2d 730, 737
(W.D. Tenn. 2010) (highlighting that courts must analyze a complaint’s substance to determine
whether it includes concepts precluded by SLUSA).
72. Segal, 581 F.3d at 310.
73. Id. at 312.
74. 658 F.3d 549, 552 (6th Cir. 2011).
75. Id. at 555.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 554.
78. Atkinson v. Morgan Asset Mgmt., Inc., 664 F. Supp. 2d 898, 907 (W.D. Tenn. 2009).
79. Atkinson, 658 F.3d at 555 (citing Atkinson, 664 F. Supp. 2d at 906–07). Other circuits
have made similar rulings. See, e.g., Dudek v. Prudential Secs., Inc., 295 F.3d 875, 879 (8th Cir.
2002) (affirming dismissal of a suit barred by SLUSA, which contained no specific allegations of
fraud or misrepresentation, but the gravamen of the complaint alleged misrepresentation or
omission).
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without leave to amend, finding that since each of the claims relied on fraud or
misrepresentation, any attempt to amend the complaint would be “futile.”80
2. The Ninth Circuit Approach: Playing Hardball . . . With the Chance of
Reprieve
The Ninth Circuit has adopted a similar approach to the Sixth Circuit by
requiring courts to consider the whole complaint when determining whether an
action is precluded by SLUSA.81 However, unlike the Sixth Circuit, it has
dismissed complaints without prejudice, granting plaintiffs leave to amend, and
has dismissed only those claims specifically barred by SLUSA, allowing others
to proceed.82
In Stoody-Broser v. Bank of America, N.A., a trust beneficiary filed a class
action suit against the trustee who invested the trust assets in affiliated mutual
funds, alleging breach of the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care.83 Plaintiff
argued that SLUSA did not apply to these allegations because the claims for
breaches of fiduciary duties were not based on misrepresentations or
80. Atkinson, 658 F.3d at 556. This ruling reflects the difficulties plaintiffs face in seeking to
avoid SLUSA preclusion under the Sixth Circuit approach when alleging misrepresentation or
omission. See supra note 55; William O. Fisher, Caselaw Developments 2011, 67 BUS. LAW. 803,
926 (2012) (noting that Atkinson signifies a judicial predilection for precluding claims through strict
application of SLUSA’s provisions). Other courts have adopted approaches similar to the Sixth
Circuit. See, e.g., Anderson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 521 F.3d 1278, 1286
(10th Cir. 2008) (declaring claims may be precluded by SLUSA if all the elements are met even if
plaintiffs have employed clever arguments to circumvent SLUSA’s requirements). In Anderson,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held Plaintiffs’ claims contained allegations of
misrepresentation and dismissed the case without leave to amend. Id. at 1288. In Behlen v. Merrill
Lynch, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held similarly to Anderson. 311 F.3d 1087, 1094–95
(11th Cir. 2002) (holding plaintiff’s claim alleged misrepresentations and omissions regarding the
sale of stock).
81. See Stoody-Broser v. Bank of America, 442 F. App’x 247, 249 (9th Cir. 2011) (reviewing
the entire complaint and determining it was precluded by SLUSA but refusing to dismiss the
complaint with prejudice). The Brown court referred to the Ninth Circuit’s approach as an
“intermediate approach” similar to the Sixth Circuit, but granting leave to amend. Brown v.
Calamos, 664 F.3d 123, 127 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 2774 (2012).
82. See Stoody-Broser, 442 F. App’x at 249; Hanson v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC,
762 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1208 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (granting Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint);
Tuttle v. Sky Bell Asset Mgmt., LLC, No. C. 10-03588 WHA, 2010 WL 4807093, at *3 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 19, 2010) (indicating that even if SLUSA precludes claims removed from state court,
plaintiffs whose claims have been removed from state court may still amend their complaints to try
to avoid preclusion); Simon v. Stang, No. C. 10-00262 JF (HRL), 2010 WL 1460430, at *7 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 12, 2010) (granting plaintiffs leave to amend, reasoning that amending their complaint
would avoid SLUSA preclusion); U.S. Mortg., Inc. v. Saxton, 494 F.3d 833, 842–43 (9th Cir. 2007)
(allowing plaintiff to amend the complaint, reasoning that Congress did not explicitly prohibit
granting leave to amend and no court has held that SLUSA completely and categorically bars any
amendment of the complaint following removal), abrogated on other grounds as recognized in
Proctor v. Vishay Intertech. Inc., 584 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2009).
83. Stoody-Broser v. Bank of America, N.A., No. C 08-02705 JSW, 2009 WL 2707393, at
*1 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 25, 2009).
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omissions.84 The District Court for the Northern District of California rejected
this argument and held SLUSA barred the suit because the complaint alleged
misrepresentations and omissions relating to the investment, including conflicts
of interest and increased expenses.85 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s decision, agreeing that SLUSA barred the complaint.86 In doing
so, the court employed a similar approach to the Sixth Circuit’s, reasoning that
the complaint alleged omissions including the failure to inform the trust
beneficiaries about its investment in proprietary mutual funds.87 The Ninth
Circuit dismissed the complaint with leave to amend, holding that doing so
might allow plaintiff to reassert her claims without alleging misrepresentation,
thereby avoiding SLUSA preclusion.88
The Ninth Circuit has also held that when only some of the claims in a
complaint are precluded by SLUSA, the court will not dismiss the entire suit;
rather, it will dismiss only those claims barred by SLUSA, allowing the rest of
the action to proceed.89 For example, in Crimi v. Barnholt, shareholders sued a
corporation’s officers and directors for breach of fiduciary duty, alleging the
officers failed to disclose important information in proxy statements.90 They
further claimed this nondisclosure deprived them of the right to make informed
voting decisions.91 Although the court dismissed the breach of fiduciary claim
because it was precluded by SLUSA, it held that the voting claim may be beyond
SLUSA’s scope, and therefore, remanded the voting claim so the lower court
could determine whether it was valid under California state law.92 The court

84. Id. at *2.
85. Id. at *3.
86. Stoody-Broser, 442 F. App’x at 248.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 249 (explaining that “a complaint may allege a violation of a trust administrator’s
fiduciary duty to the trust’s beneficiaries even where that violation involves trading in covered
securities so long as the complaint does not allege, either expressly or implicitly,
misrepresentations, omissions, or fraudulent practices coincidental to the violation”).
89. Proctor v. Vishay Intertech. Inc., 584 F.3d 1208, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009). This approach was
borrowed in part from the Second Circuit. See, e.g., Gray v. Seaboard Secs., Inc., 126 F. App’x 14,
16 (2d Cir. 2005) (rejecting the notion that entire actions containing some claims preempted by
SLUSA should be dismissed).
90. No. C. 08-02249 CRB, 2008 WL 4287566, *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2008) (noting that the
plaintiffs alleged the corporation violated a fiduciary duty by issuing backdated stock options to
officers).
91. Id. (alleging the failure to disclose backdated stock options affected their
decision-making ability as shareholders).
92. Id. at *7. The court stated that the voting right claim likely fell within the Delaware carve
out. Id. at *4. Defendants argued this claim was outside the carve-out exception because it was a
derivative allegation. Id. at *5. Assuming, arguendo, that the Defendants were correct, the court
held the claim still would not be dismissible because SLUSA does not apply to derivative actions.
Id.
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explained that if the state court determined the voting claim was valid, that claim
would be allowed to proceed in state court.93
3. The Third Circuit Approach: Playing Softball
The Third Circuit has adopted a more lenient approach, taking a narrower
view of the degree to which allegations of misrepresentation relate to the
purchase or sale of covered securities.94 For example, in Rowinski v. Salomon
Smith Barney Inc., investors sued the brokerage and investment bank firm
Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., for breach of contract and various consumer
protection violations.95 Plaintiffs alleged Smith Barney gave them misleading
advice designed only to help its other clients.96 After the case was removed to
federal court, the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
dismissed the case, declaring the plaintiffs alleged misrepresentation sufficiently
related to the purchase and sale of securities, bringing the plaintiffs’ claims
within SLUSA preclusion.97
On appeal, the Third Circuit held the complaint contained numerous
allegations of misrepresentation, which served as factual predicates to the
claims.98 However, the court acknowledged the relative difficulty in
determining whether the “in connection with the purchase or sale of any
[covered] security” requirement was met.99 Although the plaintiffs contended
that the complaint alleged breach of contract, the court sought to clarify what
was meant by “in connection with” in order to determine whether the action was
precluded by SLUSA.100

93. Id. at *7.
94. See, e.g., LaSala v. Bordier et Cie, 519 F.3d 121, 141 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that a suit
is not precluded under SLUSA if it is not essential for the plaintiff to prove misrepresentation or
omission in order to succeed); see also Brown v. Calamos, 664 F.3d 123, 127 (7th Cir. 2011)
(comparing the Third Circuit approach to the Sixth Circuit approach), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2774
(2012).
95. 398 F.3d 294, 296 (3d Cir. 2005).
96. Id. at 297.
97. Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., No. 3:02CV2014, 2003 WL 22740976, at *2–
4 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 2003).
98. Rowinski, 398 F.3d at 299–300 (noting Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that Defendant
provided biased and misleading information).
99. Id. at 300 (stating the issue in the case hinges on whether Plaintiffs’ allegations that Smith
Barney misrepresented its clients’ ratings are “connected” to the purchase or sale of securities); see
also O’Hare, supra note 30, at 328–29 (highlighting the importance of the “in connection with”
requirement and noting that courts have difficulty interpreting this element).
100. Rowkinski, 398 F.3d at 300–01. The “in connection with” requirement has been a source
of debate in numerous circuits. See, e.g., Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503, 520 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing
Madden v. Cowen & Co., 576 F.3d 957, 965–66 (9th Cir. 2009)) (holding that for the “in connection
with” requirement to be met and a claim to be barred by SLUSA, the alleged fraud and the stock
sale must coincide or “be more than tangentially related”); Romano v. Kazacos, 609 F.3d 512, 522
(2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 395 F.3d 25, 48–50
(2d Cir. 2005), vacated 547 U.S. 71 (2006)) (holding that SLUSA’s “in connection with”
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In evaluating the connection requirement, the Third Circuit looked to the
Supreme Court case Securities and Exchange Commission v. Zandford.101 In
Zandford, the Court held that plaintiffs alleging fraud had stated a cause of
action.102 The Court reasoned that the “in connection with” requirement was
satisfied by a securities fraud scheme that coincided with breaches of fiduciary
duty.103 Applying this precedent, the Rowinski court considered whether the
investors’ allegations “coincided” with the purchase or sale of securities.104 The
court also considered several other factors: (1) whether reasonable investors
would rely on the method the allegedly misrepresented information was
distributed by;105 (2) whether the parties’ relationship entailed the buying or
selling of securities; and (3) whether there was a nexus between the requested
damages and securities transactions connecting the transactions to the state law
claims.106
The Rowinski court held that the coincidence factor was met because the
complaint alleged the company misrepresented the value of securities to benefit
other clients and earn banking fees.107 The court held that the method reliance
factor was satisfied because the plaintiff alleged the investment bank’s
misrepresentation came in the form of research reports upon which investors
rely.108 The court also found that the relationship between investors and Smith
Barney met the purchase or sale requirement.109 Finally, the court found that the
plaintiffs’ prayer for relief connected their state law claims to the purchase or
sale of securities.110 Unlike the Sixth and Ninth Circuits’ approaches, the
Rowinski court’s approach not only emphasized whether the suit contained
allegations of misrepresentation, but also considered the allegations themselves
requirement is satisfied “where plaintiff’s claims ‘necessarily allege,’ ‘necessarily involve,’ or ‘rest
on’ the purchase or sale of securities”); see also Lisa R. Bugni & Jason R. Outlaw, Recent
Developments under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (“SLUSA”), 27 SEC.
LITIG. FORMS & ANALYSIS § 1:4 (2013) (emphasizing the disagreement among courts over what
constitutes “coincide”). The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to decide the meaning of the “in
connection with” requirement. See Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503, 506 (5th Cir. 2012), cert.
granted in part sub nom. Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 133 S. Ct. 977.
101. Rowkinski, 398 F.3d at 302 (citing Secs. and Exch. Comm’n v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813
(2002)).
102. Id. at 825.
103. Id. The fraud alleged in Zandford was based on Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, which makes it unlawful to make a “misstatement of fact in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.” 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011).
104. Rowinski, 398 F.3d at 302.
105. Id. (quoting Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 176 (3d Cir. 2000)).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 303 (quoting Angelastro v. Prudential Secs., Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 944 (3d Cir. 1985))
(reasoning the transaction was based on plaintiff and defendant’s broker/investor relationship).
110. Id. (stating “plaintiff seeks recovery of ‘any and all fees and charges collected from
Plaintiff and the Class,’ as well as ‘all available compensatory damages’”).
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to determine whether they were “in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities.”111 Still, the court determined the plaintiffs’ misrepresentation
allegations were “in connection with the purchase and sale of securities” and
thus barred by SLUSA.112
In LaSala v. Bordier et Cie, the Third Circuit further emphasized the necessary
relationship between the allegations and the purchase or sale of securities.113 In
LaSala, investors alleged that a software company had inflated its stock price by
stating that it was in better condition than it actually was.114 When the
company’s true financial condition was revealed, its stock price dropped,
causing substantial losses to investors.115 After the company filed for
bankruptcy, investors created a state-law trust to state claims on behalf of all
investors together rather than try them separately.116 The trustees filed suit on
behalf of the trust against Swiss banks for “aiding and abetting a breach of
fiduciary duty” by failing to investigate various transactions made by the
company’s directors.117
The District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed the action,
reasoning that the claims were based on misrepresentations and omissions of
material fact.118 On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed and remanded the case.119
In doing so, the court clarified its Rowinski holding, indicating that the case did
not mean that any misrepresentation alleged in a complaint precluded the action
under SLUSA.120 The court stated that Rowinski precludes only those
misrepresentations that are a “factual predicate” to plaintiffs’ claim.121

111. See id. at 300; Brown, 664 F.3d at 127 (noting “the contrary approach taken by the Third
Circuit . . . that if proof of a misrepresentation or of a material omission is inessential to the
plaintiff’s success, the allegation is no bar to the suit.”).
112. Rowinski, F.3d at 305.
113. 519 F.3d 121, 141 (3d Cir. 2008).
114. Id. at 126. The actions by the software company’s directors are known as a “pump and
dump” scheme where an individual “touts (‘pumps’) a stock by making baseless projections about
its future share price and/or unjustified forecasts about the company’s future earnings” causing the
stock price to rise substantially. David B. Kramer, The Way It Is and the Way It Should Be: Liability
Under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 Thereunder for Making False and Misleading
Statements as Part of a Scheme to “Pump and Dump” a Stock, 13 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 243, 245
(2005). After prices have sufficiently risen, but before the truthful information is discovered, the
individual dumps the investment and profits from the difference.” Id.
115. LaSala, 519 F.3d at 126.
116. Id. at 127.
117. Id.
118. LaSala v. Bordier et Cie, 452 F. Supp. 2d 575, 588 (D. N.J. 2006).
119. LaSala, 519 F.3d at 143.
120. Id. at 141.
121. Id. Other jurisdictions have adopted similar approaches. See, e.g., Xpedior Creditor Trust
v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA) Inc., 341 F. Supp. 2d 258, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (stating that
courts should pay less attention to the words plaintiffs use in the complaint, but focus on “whether
a material misstatement or omission in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security
is a necessary component of the claim”). But see Atkinson v. Morgan Asset Mgmt., Inc., 658 F.3d
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According to the court, factual predicate misrepresentations are those that, if
true, would render the defendant liable in the present action.122 Allegations that,
even if true, would fail to render the defendant liable are “extraneous
allegations.”123 The court explained that in light of the heightened pleading
standards under PSLRA, plaintiffs might be more apt to include excessive
information in complaints, possibly including information that may be
misinterpreted as alleging misrepresentation even though it is not actually “in
connection with the purchase or sale of covered securities.”124 Under Third
Circuit precedent, including “extraneous allegations” in a complaint does not
preclude a claim under SLUSA.125
Applying this distinction between factual predicates and extraneous details,
the court held the plaintiffs’ misrepresentation claims against the Swiss banks
were extraneous.126 The court found that because the claims against the banks
were for breaches of fiduciary duty and failure to investigate the directors’
money-laundering transactions, any alleged misrepresentation by the software
company regarding its financial condition and stock price was not a factual
predicate.127 Rather, it was background information necessary to understand the
claims against the banks.128 As the trust’s allegations of misrepresentation were
not in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security, the LaSala
court held that the trustees’ claims were not precluded by SLUSA.129 As
represented by LaSala, the Third Circuit allows those individual claims not
barred by SLUSA to proceed even when the action contains other claims that
are precluded.130 As a result, it is easier for plaintiffs in the Third Circuit to
avoid SLUSA preclusion.131

549, 555 (6th Cir. 2011) (rejecting plaintiffs’ claim that their action is not barred by SLUSA
because they “‘do not allege any actual purchases or sales as the factual predicate for any of their
claims.’”).
122. LaSala, 519 F.3d at 141.
123. Id.
124. Id. (emphasizing the important distinction between extraneous details and factual
predicates because many complaints are overinclusive).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 143 (holding that the Trust’s allegations that the software company aided and abetted
the Bank’s alleged breach of fiduciary duties were not barred by SLUSA).
130. See id.; see also In re Lord Abbett Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 553 F.3d 248, 254 (3d Cir.
2009) (holding SLUSA does not require an entire action that contains non-SLUSA precluded
claims be dismissed).
131. See, e.g., LaSala, 519 F.3d at 143; see also Stephens v. Gentilello, 853 F. Supp. 2d 462,
468 (D. N.J. 2012) (citing LaSala, 519 F.3d at 141) (holding that a securities class action claim was
not barred by SLUSA because the misrepresentations plaintiffs alleged served as background
details which did not need to be proved for plaintiffs to succeed).
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D. Framing the Split: The Brown Perspective
The Seventh Circuit recently addressed the circuit split over how to handle
potential SLUSA-related complaints in Brown v. Calamos.132 In Brown, the
court considered whether a securities class action complaint “alleged the
misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase
or sale of a covered security” and was thereby barred by SLUSA.133
The Brown plaintiffs were shareholders who owned common stock in
Calamos Convertible Opportunities and Income Fund (“the Fund”), a
closed-end investment fund.134 The shareholders were considered corporate
owners whose assets were investments in the Fund.135 The Fund also issued
preferred stock known as Auction Market Preferred Stock (“AMPS”), which had
low interest rates and no maturity date.136 It then invested money obtained from
the AMPS and the sale of common stock, the proceeds of which went to benefit
common shareholders.137 After the market crashed in 2008, the Fund redeemed
the AMPS and replaced them with money borrowed from relatively high
interest, short-term loans.138 In response, shareholders of the Fund’s common
stock filed a class action lawsuit alleging breach of fiduciary duty and unjust
enrichment.139 The shareholders argued that they chose to invest in the Fund
based on the indefinite leverage created by the supposedly perpetual AMPS.140
They also claimed that a conflict of interest was created when the Fund redeemed
the AMPS because the Fund did so in part to benefit other banks.141 Notably,
the complaint contained a disclaimer stating plaintiffs were not making a claim
of misrepresentation connected to securities.142 The District Court for the
132. 664 F.3d at 127.
133. Id. at 125.
134. Id. In a closed-end fund, owners cannot redeem their shares. Id. This differs from an
open-ended fund, in which shareholders can sell their shares at any time. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. The court noted that the dividends in AMPS functioned more like an interest, rather
than a return on equity securities, and that the preferred stock operated more like a type of debt. Id.
at 126. AMPS paid a dividend at short intervals by auction, in which the highest bidder gets the
preferred shares with the lowest interest rates. Id. at 125. With no maturity date, AMPS could be
held indefinitely. Id.
137. Id. According to the complaint, the AMPS benefitted common shareholders well because
the funds generated by the AMPS, which had low interest rates, were used to buy
higher-return investments. Id.
138. Id. at 126 (indicating unlike the stability offered by the low interest AMPS, high interest,
short-term loans increased the Fund’s risk by cutting away at its capital base).
139. Brown v. Calamos, 777 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1129 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
140. Id. at 1130.
141. Id. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the Fund put its strong interest in keeping a positive
relationship with the investment banks and brokers, who had sold the AMPS to the investors, ahead
of its fiduciary duties to its shareholders because the banks and brokers facilitated its beneficial
business model. Id.
142. Id. at 1131. The complaint specifically stated “‘[p]laintiff does not assert by this action
any claim arising from a misstatement or omission in connection with the purchase or sale of a
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Northern District of Illinois concluded that the suit was barred by SLUSA
because the plaintiffs’ claims included allegations of misrepresentation, the
perpetual nature of the AMPS, and omission, defendants’ failure to disclose the
conflict of interest arising from its dealings with other banks.143
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit, like the Sixth Circuit, attributed little
significance to the disclaimer in the complaint.144 The court interpreted the
language used in the complaint that referred to the shareholders’ belief that
leverage from the AMPS would continue indefinitely as alleging a
misrepresentation regarding the longevity of the class of stock.145 The court also
found that the complaint alleged a misleading omission by the Fund that the
AMPS could be redeemed at any time.146
After making these determinations, the court examined the different
approaches taken by other circuits, weighing how each would rule on whether
the complaint contained allegations of misrepresentation or omission in
connection with the purchase or sale of covered securities.147 The court noted
that the Sixth Circuit would take a “literalist approach” if hearing the case and
would impliedly dismiss the suit because the complaint contains allegations of
misrepresentation and omissions of fact.148 The court also considered the Third
Circuit’s approach, stating that even under this approach, plaintiffs’ claims are
likely precluded because the alleged fraud is a factual predicate of plaintiffs’
claim.149 The court then considered taking the Ninth Circuit’s intermediate
approach by employing a similar “literalist approach” while allowing plaintiffs
to file an amended complaint to avoid SLUSA preclusion.150 The court doubted
that this approach would work because it might allow plaintiffs to allege fraud
again in a new complaint and thus burden the judiciary with hearing another suit
precluded by SLUSA.151 The court acknowledged that the reviewing court could
then remove and dismiss the case with prejudice should the new complaint

security, nor does plaintiff allege that defendants engaged in fraud in connection with the purchase
or sale of a security.’” Id.
143. Id. at 1132.
144. Brown v. Calamos, 664 F.3d 123, 126 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 2774 (2012).
145. Id. at 126–27 (noting also that “a reasonable jury might find that the passage insinuated
that a significant benefit of investing in the fund was that the investor would obtain leverage
indefinitely because the AMPS had no maturity date.”).
146. Id. at 127 (noting that the language plaintiff used in the complaint amounted to “an
allegation of failure to disclose a conflict of interest that if disclosed would have given pause to
potential investors”).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 127–29 (explaining the fraud alleged by the plaintiffs is a factual predicate to the
plaintiffs’ claims because it is, arguably, inextricably entwined with the plaintiffs’ other claims).
150. Id. at 127.
151. Id. (generally disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit’s approach as complaints do not dictate
the breadth of litigation in American law).
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contain allegations precluded by SLUSA.152 Still, the court feared that
allegations of fraud might become entangled in the new, potentially complex,
suit after the case had already proceeded beyond pleadings, dragging out the
litigation.153 For these reasons, the court seemed unwilling to apply the Ninth
Circuit’s approach.154
The Brown court concluded that the shareholders’ claims were barred by
SLUSA under both the Sixth and Third Circuit approaches, because the
complaint alleged misrepresentation and fraud likely integral to the breach of
duty claims.155 The court affirmed the suit’s dismissal and dismissed it without
explicitly adopting one of these approaches over the other.156
II. TRYING TO HEAL A FRACTURE: THE APPROACHES OF OTHER CIRCUITS FAIL
TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVES OF SLUSA
The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to resolve the circuit split over allegations of
misrepresentations in complaints as it relates to SLUSA and is unlikely to do so
in the near future as the Court recently denied a petition for certiorari in the
Brown case.157 The three approaches to addressing these complaints are
different enough to present potential problems for plaintiffs and defendants
trying to litigate these cases. The Third Circuit’s approach is far more lenient
than the Sixth and Ninth Circuit approaches, both in its interpretation of the
requirement that allegations of misrepresentation coincide with the purchase or
sale of covered securities, and in its requirement that allegations of
misrepresentation operate as factual predicates to plaintiffs’ claims.158 It follows
that the current split encourages forum shopping in favor of plaintiff-friendly
jurisdictions.159 Plaintiffs may try to find a way to bring their actions in the
Third Circuit, as securities class action lawsuits in that jurisdiction are barred by
SLUSA only if allegations of misrepresentation or omission are “essential” to

152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 130.
156. Id. at 130–31.
157. Brown v. Calamos, 132 S. Ct. 2774 (2012).
158. See, e.g., Brown v. Calamos, 664 F.3d 132, 127 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that the Third
Circuit determined that an allegation of misrepresentation that is not vital to a plaintiff’s success is
one that should not be precluded), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 2774 (2012); LaSala v. Bordier et Cie,
519 F.3d 121, 141 (3d Cir. 2008) (refining the Third Circuit’s particular take on allegations of
misrepresentation).
159. See O’Brien, supra note 26 (stating the uncertainty about the way in which to properly
interpret securities class action laws such as SLUSA has resulted in inconsistent application of the
laws by federal courts, creating uncertainty over outcomes for defendants in suits based on these
laws).
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plaintiffs’ success.160 Furthermore, under the Third Circuit approach, any claims
not barred by SLUSA may proceed even if the complaint contains some claims
barred by SLUSA.161 Conversely, plaintiffs are likely to avoid jurisdictions such
as the Sixth Circuit because the Sixth Circuit’s broad interpretation of what
constitutes a claim barred by SLUSA makes it tougher for plaintiffs to
succeed.162 Though Brown describes the different approaches, highlighting the
strengths and weaknesses of each, it fails to explicitly endorse an approach.163
In order to resolve the confusion over this issue and prevent forum shopping,
one approach should apply for these cases no matter which circuit the case is
tried in. A proper approach would ask whether there is a reasonable relationship
between the alleged misrepresentation and plaintiffs’ claims. Although the
various approaches may seem consistent with SLUSA, each suffers from flaws,
rendering it inconsistent with SLUSA.
A. Easier Said Than Done: The Practical Implications of the Ninth Circuit’s
Approach Make It Inconsistent With the Purpose and Language of SLUSA
1. Language Barrier: The Ninth Circuit’s Approach is Inconsistent with the
Language of SLUSA
Although the Ninth Circuit’s approach is similar to the Sixth Circuit’s insofar
as it dismisses suits containing any allegations of misrepresentation or omission,
the Ninth Circuit allows plaintiffs to amend the complaint and remove any
allegations of fraud so the suit may proceed.164 Supporters of this approach may
argue that it presents a prudent course of action because it grants plaintiffs leave
to amend if the complaint contains allegations precluded by SLUSA.165 The
Ninth Circuit’s approach also prevents plaintiffs from being penalized for
160. LaSala, 519 F.3d at 141 (holding a securities class action suit alleging fraud or
misrepresentation is only barred by SLUSA when the allegations “operate as a factual predicate to
a legal claim”).
161. See, e.g., In re Lord Abbett Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 553 F.3d 248, 254 (3d Cir. 2009)
(allowing claims not barred by SLUSA to proceed).
162. See, e.g., Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., 581 F.3d 305, 311 (6th Cir. 2009) (examining
not just the words, but the substance of the complaint in holding that a suit alleged misrepresentation
and was therefore barred by SLUSA).
163. Brown, 664 F.3d at 130–31; see also Part I.D (discussing the Brown court’s treatment of
the circuit split and decision not to select an approach).
164. See, e.g., Stoody-Broser v. Bank of America, 442 F.App’x 247, 249 (9th Cir. 2011)
(reviewing the entire complaint and determining it was precluded by SLUSA but refusing to dismiss
the complaint with prejudice); see also supra Part I.C.2 (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s approach to
handling complaints containing claims potentially precluded by SLUSA).
165. See U.S. Mortg., Inc. v. Saxton, 494 F.3d 833, 843 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that
complaints may be amended after removal to federal court), abrogated on other grounds by Proctor
v. Vishay Intertech. Inc., 584 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2009); Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 898
(9th Cir. 2002) (stating that “[d]ismissal without leave to amend is improper unless it is clear, upon
de novo review, that the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” (quoting Polich v.
Burlington N., Inc., 942 F.2d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir. 1991))).
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including too much information in the complaint.166 But this approach is also
not without its shortcomings.
Granting plaintiffs leave to amend their complaints is inconsistent with the
language of SLUSA.167 SLUSA removes those actions containing allegations
of misrepresentation or omission “in connection with the purchase or sale of a
covered security” to federal court where they will be dismissed.168 At no point
does the statute mention granting plaintiffs leave to amend or provide them the
opportunity to remove allegations of misrepresentation or omission so those
claims not precluded by SLUSA may proceed.169 Rather, SLUSA states that the
entire action shall be removed to federal court—not just those specific claims
alleging misrepresentation.170
2. The Ninth Circuit’s Approach Is Inconsistent with the Purpose of SLUSA
Permitting leave to amend also defeats the purpose of SLUSA by granting
plaintiffs the opportunity to learn why the court believes the claim is precluded
and allows them to make changes based on these defects.171 Granting leave to
amend and allowing a claim to proceed permits plaintiffs to craft a restructured
complaint that removes explicit allegations of misrepresentation, but leaves open
the possibility that questions of misrepresentation may arise later in the
litigation.172 Allowing plaintiffs to alter their complaints to remove unrelated
allegations of misrepresentation or omission runs contrary to SLUSA’s
administrative efficiency goal—decreasing the volume of these cases in federal

166. See U.S. Mortg., Inc., 494 F.3d at 843 (pointing out that district courts have noted that it
is often unfair to dismiss actions that are valid under state law simply because a plaintiff included
a claim that the court could interpret as a federal claim). However, the court also acknowledged
that this approach allows plaintiffs to circumvent SLUSA by creatively pleading to avoid bringing
the action in federal court. Id.
167. The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of focusing on the statute’s plain
language when construing the meaning of a statute. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring).
168. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b)–(c) (2006).
169. See id. (failing to mention leave to amend complaints). Furthermore, the legislative
history indicates that this notion of leave to amend was never discussed during the debate over the
bill. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 105-182 (1998) (failing to discuss whether to incorporate a leave to
amend provision in the law); H.R. REP. 105-803 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (same).
170. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(f)(2) (2006); Mark A. Perry & Indraneel Sur, SLUSA Precludes
“Actions,” Not Claims, MEALEY’S EMERGING SEC. LITIG., Mar. 2009 at 5–6, available at
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/Perry-Sur-SLUSAPrecludesActionsNot
Claims.pdf (noting that SLUSA refers to the covered suits as “actions” and pointing out that the
ordinary legal meaning of “action” is an entire lawsuit and, therefore, a dismissed action should be
dismissed in full even if only some of the claims are precluded by SLUSA).
171. See Brown v. Calamos, 664 F.3d 123, 127 (7th Cir. 2011) (acknowledging that granting
leave to amend allows plaintiffs to amend their complaint so it no longer contains fraudulent
allegations and is no longer precluded by SLUSA), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 2774 (2012).
172. Id. (expressing concerns that plaintiffs might overtax courts by raising fraud allegations
during litigation based on a new state-court complaint filed after the dismissal of the removed suit).
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courts by remanding them to state courts.173 As the Brown court noted, the Ninth
Circuit’s approach may actually increase the number of complaints if plaintiffs
are granted leave to amend because plaintiffs whose initial complaints were
dismissed will have the opportunity to file those complaints again.174
Additionally, allowing leave to amend also frustrates SLUSA’s and PSLRA’s
judicial efficiency goals because it may allow litigation to drag on
unnecessarily.175
B. Easier Said Than Done . . . Again: The Practical Implications of the Third
Circuit’s Approach Defeat the Language and Intent of SLUSA
Supporters of the Third Circuit approach may point out that this approach
helps meritorious claims avoid preclusion based on an unrelated allegation. 176
However, the Third Circuit’s approach presents problems when determining
whether an allegation is precluded by SLUSA. The approach contradicts the
purpose of SLUSA and is inconsistent with the law’s language. The Third
Circuit’s approach contradicts SLUSA’s purpose because it allows suits alleging
misrepresentation or omission to proceed.177 It is inconsistent with the law’s
language, like the Ninth Circuit’s approach, because it allows individual claims
that not precluded by SLUSA to move forward.178 The Third Circuit’s approach
only precludes claims under SLUSA if they contain an allegation of
173. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
174. Brown, 664 F.3d at 127 (disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit’s approach, which grants
plaintiffs leave to amend complaints).
175. Id.; see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 82 (2006)
(discussing PSLRA’s goal of promptly eliminating frivolous suits).
176. One criticism of PSLRA and SLUSA is that the laws may prevent legitimate claims from
proceeding. See Painter, supra note 32, at 35 (remarking that laws such as PSLRA make it more
difficult for defrauded investors to file suit). This was a concern shared by some U.S. Senators and
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission at the time SLUSA was passed. See S. REP. NO.
105-182, at 19 (1998) (opposing SLUSA because preempting actions from being brought in state
courts may leave investors without a remedy); The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of
1997—S. 1260: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. 40 (1997) (statement of Arthur Levitt, Jr., Chairman, U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission) (expressing concern that SLUSA may limit protections
available to investors under state law). Individuals have also criticized SLUSA on grounds that
preempting claims from being brought in state court is inconsistent with America’s system of
federalism. See Implementation of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. On Fin. and Hazardous Materials of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 105th
Cong. 66–67 (1997) (statement of Robert V. Stout, Controller, City of Stamford, CT) (arguing
States should be allowed to use their own securities laws to safeguard their citizens); Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1997: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. and Hazardous
Materials, of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 74 (1998) (statement of Richard W. Painter,
Professor, Cornell University School of Law) (arguing that Congress should not preempt state law
as it applies to securities fraud because Congress had not demonstrated that state securities laws
sufficiently interfered with federal laws so as to justify their preemption).
177. See supra Part I.C.3.
178. See supra Parts I.C.3 & III.A.1.
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misrepresentation or omission that “operates as a factual predicate to a legal
claim.”179
The Third Circuit’s approach, like the Ninth Circuit’s approach, also tends to
frustrate judicial efficiency goals. First, the approach may prolong the pleading
stage of litigation as plaintiffs may dispute whether allegations are truly factual
predicates to the plaintiffs’ claims.180 Second, by enacting SLUSA, Congress
intended to resolve nationally traded securities-based actions in federal, not
state, court.181 Allowing certain securities claims to proceed in state court
frustrates this objective. Third, the Third Circuit’s approach is likely to prolong
litigation and to encourage plaintiffs to manipulate their claims to bring the
action in state court over federal court, instead of curbing abusive litigation like
PSLRA and SLUSA sought to do.182 Furthermore, under the Third Circuit’s
approach, defendants may be forced to settle when faced with having to waste
time and resources arguing over whether a plaintiff’s misrepresentation or
omission allegation operates as a factual predicate that should preclude the
claim.183 This disadvantage to defendants directly contradicts the purpose for
which PSLRA and SLUSA were enacted.184
Furthermore, the Third Circuit’s approach may also encourage “artful
pleading,” whereby plaintiffs attempt to disguise allegations of
misrepresentation or omission as ancillary to the central claims of the action.185
The approach may allow claims that appear independent of misrepresentation or
omission allegations to proceed, only to discover later in litigation that the
claims are, in fact, dependent upon such allegations.186 Although the court may
179. LaSala v. Bordier et Cie, 519 F.3d 121, 141 (3d Cir. 2008).
180. See id. at 140–41.
181. H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 15 (1998) (Conf. Rep.).
182. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 1 (enacting SLUSA “to prevent certain State private
securities class action lawsuits alleging fraud from being used “to frustrate the objectives of
[PSLRA]”); S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 10 (1995) (enacting PSLRA to prevent abusive litigation).
183. See O’Hare, supra note 30, at 335 (explaining that defendants were often forced to settle
claims that they would likely have won in court because settling would be cheaper than extensive
litigation battles that might ensue in a SLUSA-based suit); see also Alexander, Do the Merits
Matter?, supra note 28, at 529 (arguing that defendants in securities class action litigation tend to
settle even if the plaintiff’s claims are not meritorious because of the risks and costs associated with
litigation).
184. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006) (stating
that that PSLRA was enacted in part to prevent “nuisance filings, targeting of deep-pocket
defendants, [and] vexatious discovery requests”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 2 (explaining
that SLUSA was enacted to prevent state private securities class action lawsuits from circumventing
PSLRA’s provisions); H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (seeking to prevent
abusive litigation which may force defendants to pay substantial sums of money to settle).
185. This artful pleading problem, whereby plaintiffs avoid mentioning misrepresentation or
omission while still essentially alleging these concepts, caused the Sixth Circuit to look beyond the
words of a complaint. See, e.g., Atkinson v. Morgan Asset Mgmt., Inc., 658 F.3d 549, 555 (6th
Cir. 2011) (disregarding Plaintiffs’ “artful” disclaimer which denied any allegations of fraud).
186. The discovery process in these suits also allowed plaintiffs to find facts to try to validate
claims separate from those that they alleged. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31, 37.
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dismiss the suit once this problem is discovered, defendants may have already
incurred substantial litigation costs and may have even settled before
discovering the claims should have been dismissed from the beginning.187 These
problems render the Third Circuit’s approach inconsistent with the language and
intent of SLUSA.
C. Getting Closer: Although Consistent with Many of SLUSA’s Goals, the
Sixth Circuit’s Approach Is Too Broad
Of the approaches currently in use, the Sixth Circuit’s approach is most
consistent with SLUSA’s objectives. The Sixth Circuit’s approach bars any suits
containing allegations of fraud (including misrepresentations and omissions),
regardless of their relationship to the legal claims in the complaint.188 In doing
so, it prevents plaintiffs alleging misrepresentation from dodging SLUSA
preclusion merely by omitting words traditionally associated with
misrepresentation.189 Although the Sixth Circuit’s approach is more consistent
with the SLUSA than the Third or Ninth Circuits’ approaches, its broad test for
determining when SLUSA preclusion applies is draconian and over-inclusive
because it bars all claims having any relationship to allegations of
misrepresentation or omission.190
187. See id. (explaining that the discovery process can be extremely expensive for defendants);
Alexander, Do the Merits Matter?, supra note 28, at 514.
188. See Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., 581 F.3d 305, 311 (6th Cir. 2009) (asking only
whether the complaint included allegations prohibited by SLUSA). Of course, the allegations must
still be “in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.”
15 U.S.C. § 77p(b)(1) (2006); see also Atkinson, 658 F.3d at 555 (holding plaintiffs’ claims satisfied
the connection requirement under SLUSA’s preclusion provisions).
189. See, e.g., Atkinson, 658 F.3d at 555 (holding plaintiffs’ claims were precluded by SLUSA
based on their substance even though the plaintiffs included a disclaimer stating that the claims did
not include the precluded allegations); see also Brown v. Calamos, 664 F.3d 123, 126 (7th Cir.
2011) (ignoring plaintiff’s insistence that the action was for breach of fiduciary duty and
interpreting the claim as alleging a misrepresentation), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 2774 (2012); Instituto
De Prevision Militar v. Merrill Lynch, 546 F.3d 1340, 1350 (11th Cir. 2008) (reasoning that since
plaintiffs’ second amended complaint’s negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims alleged
misrepresentation, they were precluded by SLUSA). But see Tuttle v. Sky Bell Asset Mgmt., No.
C 10-03588 WHA, 2010 WL 4807093, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2010) (“SLUSA does not preclude
breach of fiduciary duty or contract claims unless they sound in fraud and are thus properly viewed
as mislabeled securities law claims.”). Critics of this approach have argued that when claims do
not contain explicit references to misrepresentations or omissions, but instead allege claims such
as breach of fiduciary duty, SLUSA preclusion provisions may infringe upon States’ police powers.
See Brief of Eleven Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 9, Brown v.
Calamos, 132 S. Ct. 2774 (2012) (No. 11-1173) (arguing that SLUSA’s preclusion provisions are
“contrary to constitutionally protected states’ interests in policing breaches of fiduciary duty”). The
law professors seem to rely on the federalism argument discussed supra note 176.
190. Some have characterized the Sixth Circuit’s broad approach as a “black hole” which
prevents claims having any relationship to the misrepresentation or deception at hand. Barry
Barnett, The Black Hole of SLUSA; Sixth Circuit Okays Oblivion (Update), BLAWGLETTER, (Sept.
18, 2009), http://blawgletter.typepad.com/bbarnett/2009/09/the-black-hole-of-slusa-sixth-circuit
-okays-oblivion.html.
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III. COURTS SHOULD ADOPT A REASONABLE RELATIONSHIP TEST
To determine whether an allegation is precluded by SLUSA, federal courts
should ask whether the misrepresentation alleged is reasonably related the
plaintiffs’ claim. If so, the entire suit should be dismissed; if not, all of the claims
should be allowed to proceed. This approach best achieves SLUSA’s goals
because it does not bar all claims alleging misrepresentation, only those
reasonably related to plaintiffs’ claim. Furthermore, this approach prevents
plaintiffs from dodging SLUSA and prevents precluded securities class actions
from burdening the judiciary.
The phrase “reasonable relationship” has yet to be employed by courts in
judging whether claims are precluded by SLUSA.191 However, this test is
prevalent in other areas of law such as assessing takings claims and punitive
damage awards in tort actions.192 The reasonable relationship test has also been
used in the context of mutual fund fee litigation.193 The reasonable relationship
test evinces a standard, which is easy to satisfy.194 In the SLUSA context, the
test will cast a wide net in determining whether claims are precluded.195
The reasonable relationship test is also consistent with the objectives of
SLUSA.
It would preclude those claims containing allegations of

191. See Brown, 664 F.3d at 127 (discussing the approaches taken by circuit courts in
determining whether claims are precluded by SLUSA and failing to indicate any of them use a
“reasonable relationship” test).
192. For example, a number of courts have applied this test in the context of zoning and
property rights cases. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 390 (1994) (acknowledging
that many courts have used a “reasonable relationship” test to determine whether conditionally
granting a building permit in exchange for a property owner conveying land for some public use is
permissible); see also Nollan v. Calif. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 853 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that there was no unconstitutional taking of land because there was a
reasonable relationship between a city’s conditional grant of a building permit in exchange for
homeowners allowing a public easement). Courts have also used this test to determine whether
punitive damage awards are excessive. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 580
(1996) (recognizing the idea that punitive damages must bear a “‘reasonable relationship’ to
compensatory damages has a long pedigree”); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S.
443, 460 (1993) (declaring that “punitive damages should bear a reasonable relationship to the harm
that is likely to occur from the defendant’s conduct” (quoting Garnes v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413
S.E.2d 897, 909 (W. Va. 1991))).
193. See Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2d Cir. 1982)
(stating that adviser-managers of investment funds may be liable for breach of fiduciary duty if
they charge a fee that is “so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the
services rendered”).
194. See Jason R. Biggs, Comment, Nollan and Dolan: The End of Municipal Land Use
Extortion—A California Perspective, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 515, 545 (1996) (noting that the
reasonable relationship test is “easily satisfied” in the context of regulatory takings).
195. See Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., 581 F.3d 305, 310 (6th Cir. 2009) (examining the
“substance of allegations in a complaint” to determine whether claims are precluded by SLUSA).
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misrepresentation by dismissing the entire suit with prejudice.196 As a result,
this approach does not suffer from the artful pleading infirmity, nor does it create
any exceptions that may still allow certain claims to proceed in state court.197 In
accomplishing the objectives of SLUSA, the reasonable relationship approach
serves PSLRA’s and SLUSA’s purposes by helping to end frivolous securities
class action litigation.198
Moreover, unlike the Sixth Circuit, the reasonable relationship test will not
bar claims that have little or no relation to the misrepresentations alleged.199 As
the Brown court recognized, the Sixth Circuit’s overly broad approach is subject
to criticism.200 The court argued that dismissing an entire case is too harsh a
result for information which may be “an irrelevancy added to the complaint out
of an anxious desire to leave no stone unturned.”201 The reasonable relationship
test serves to counteract this criticism. If information contained in an allegation
is in fact an “irrelevancy,” then it will bear no reasonable relationship to the
claim.202 Consequently, it will fail the test, the claim will not be precluded, and
the suit will proceed. However, if information regarding a misrepresentation is
relevant and reasonably related to the claim, the test is satisfied and the action
should be dismissed.
Critics may argue this approach is too harsh and prevents possible meritorious
claims from proceeding.203 However, the reasonable relationship approach is

196. See supra note 170 and accompanying text (explaining that SLUSA’s preclusive
provisions have been interpreted as referring to dismissal or removal of the entire complaint and
not merely the claims containing precluded allegations).
197. Like the Sixth Circuit’s approach, the reasonable relationship test would dismiss an entire
complaint if the action contains claims precluded by SLUSA. See, e.g, Segal, 581 F.3d at 309
(stating that SLUSA bars the whole complaint if it contains any allegations of misrepresentation or
omission, rather than just the specific claim). Under the reasonable relationship test, plaintiffs
would only be able bring suit in state court without SLUSA preclusion when the Delaware carve
out or State action methods, specifically enumerated by Congress, applied. See supra note 44
(discussing the exceptions to SLUSA’s preclusion provisions).
198. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (seeking to eliminate abusive
litigation practices).
199. See Segal, 581 F.3d at 311 (asking only whether the complaint refers to “prohibited
theories” under SLUSA and precluding those which do).
200. Brown v. Calamos, 664 F.3d 123, 128 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 2774 (2012).
201. Id.
202. Although courts have not ruled on whether an irrelevancy in a SLUSA complaint would
fail the reasonable relationship test, Nollan provides an example of when this test is not satisfied.
Nollan v. Calif. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 838–39 (1987) (holding that there was no
reasonable relationship between granting only a conditional permit because a proposed home
interferes with “visual access” to the beach when a public easement granting access to the beach is
all that is required).
203. See Painter, supra note 32, at 35 (acknowledging laws such as PSLRA and SLUSA make
it difficult for defrauded investors to obtain a judicial remedy); see also S. REP. NO.
105-182, at 23 (1998) (arguing that PSLRA’s “provisions prevent investors from bringing
meritorious securities fraud class action claims.”).
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entirely consistent with the aims of SLUSA.204 If individuals believe SLUSA’s
scope should be narrower, they must rely on the legislature to change the
language of SLUSA.205 For example, supporters of the Ninth Circuit’s approach
could ask Congress to include a specific provision in the statute allowing the
opportunity to amend a complaint. Similarly, those in favor of the Third
Circuit’s approach could ask Congress to raise the threshold for when claims are
precluded and adopt language stating that only those misrepresentations which
serve as factual predicates to the claim are precluded by SLUSA. Until Congress
does this, courts should apply the reasonable relationship test, rather than a test
that risks distorting the law’s meaning.206
IV. CONCLUSION
The significant circuit split over the proper interpretation of SLUSA’s
language and the requisite relationship misrepresentation must bear to the claim
to incur SLUSA preclusion should be resolved. Unless this split is resolved by
adopting one approach over another, plaintiffs might exploit the differences
between approaches to their advantage. Plaintiffs may try to file in a circuit with
a less stringent approach, so that if the case is removed to federal court, it may
be remanded to state court and proceed. Allowing this forum shopping to occur
defeats the purpose of SLUSA. Adopting the reasonable relationship approach
proposed in this Comment would best prevent this abuse and help to maintain
the purpose for which PSLRA and SLUSA were enacted. This approach is not
an absolute bar to all securities litigation. Instead, it will permit individuals to
confidently invest in securities, thereby promoting market prosperity.

204. See SLUSA, Pub. L. No. 105-353, sec. 2(5), 112 Stat. 3227, 3227 (1998) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (seeking to prevent “private securities class action
lawsuits alleging fraud from being used to frustrate the objectives” of PSLRA”).
205. Robert W. Taylor, Note, Re-Evaluating Holder Actions: Giving Defrauded Securities
Holders A Fighting Chance, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 413, 436–37 (2011) (arguing that “[b]y
enacting legislation, Congress could strike a much better balance [than courts] between the interests
of defrauded shareholders and corporations.”).
206. See Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Repub. Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008)
(emphasizing “the fundamental principle of judicial restraint that courts should [not] . . . ‘formulate
a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.’”
(quoting Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring))); see also In re
Lord Abbett Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 553 F.3d 248, 254 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Rosenberg v. XM
Ventures, 274 F.3d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 2001)) (declaring that courts should not substitute their own
judgment for congressional intent).

